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INTRODUCTION 
A cursory review of the literature suggests that the word "in-
telligence" itself is likely to be problematic. Blackstock and Schaf, for 
example, in the introduction to their annotated bibliography of the field 
in English note that: 
. . . even the terms used are confused and confusing. 
Expressions such as "Soviet (or U.S.) intelligence" are 
used as a kind of shorthand for all the intelligence and 
security agencies of the state concerned. . . . [PJopular 
usage confused espionage . . . with the entire in-
telligence function. Melodramatic spy novels and mo-
tion pictures reinforce this mistaken notion.1 
And apparently, the situation is no better in other languages.2 
Four factors lie at the root of the problem. One has been partly 
alluded to in the observations above. "Intelligence" is a synecdoche in 
the true sense of the word. It is used to represent both a larger whole and 
a smaller part. In the former case it is used to mean not only the collec-
tion of information and the analysis thereof but also all the activities of 
organizations forming an intelligence community (i.e. those doing 
special operations, counterintelligence and security work, etc.). In the 
latter case it is sometimes used interchangeably with the word "es-
pionage" which constitutes but one small part of an intelligence effort. 
The second factor concerns the occasional need of intelligence agencies 
to use euphemisms for what in blunt language might be politically unac-
ceptable. This is particular true where covert operations are concerned. 
Thirdly, intelligence does not exist in either a verb or gerund form. This 
makes it difficult to perceive what activities are actually included under 
this heading.* This fact is particularly important for historical work. 
Researchers at some point have to make choices over the boundaries of 
their subject area. And this means confronting head on the chicken and 
egg dilemmas that relate to the structure and function of organizations. 
To these must be added the problem of knowledge, particularly the need 
for secrecy and obfuscation that form part of the process of security and 
intelligence work. 
Such problems make it necessary to read the security and in-
telligence literature in ways that other fields might not normally require. 
Attention must be paid to the national origin and the international focus 
of the political culture in which material is written. Due regard must be 
given to the status of the writer and whether or not he or she has access to 
inside knowledge. And, in particular, the purpose behind the writer's 
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endeavors must be evaluated. Only in this way can the trustworthiness of 
the literature be established. 
The discussion which follows only analyses the English language 
literature on a selective basis. But it does so in such a way as to provide 
discrete perspectives. The division of labour follows a set path. It begins 
with a commentary on those who have focussed attention on the 
literature from some sort of global or multinational perspective. It then 
looks at the two national literatures that have dominated the field (the 
American and British). The purpose here is to see whether and how these 
literatures have defined "intelligence." This is then followed by an 
analysis of the literature concerning the activities of Soviet and Eastern 
Bloc security and intelligence organizations. Alternative frames of 
reference are then sought from other political cultures (from pariah 
states, from non-western nations). Finally, the Canadian literature is ex-
amined with a view to comparing its strengths and weaknesses with those 
of other political cultures, particularly those which have most influenced 
Canadian political development.4 
I. THE LITERATURE AS A WHOLE: 
The literature on intelligence-related matters is now extremely exten-
sive and growing rapidly.3 Books, journal articles, government 
documents, media reports and documentaries on such diverse topics as 
active measures (covert operations), codes and signals, crimes against the 
state, disinformation (deception), defence policy, electronic intercepts, 
espionage, individual rights, intelligence agencies, national security, 
nuclear deterrence, peace movements, political violence, policing, pro-
paganda, public order, sabotage, secrecy, subversion, surveillance, ter-
rorism and war now make up complete libraries in their own right.6 
This wealth of literature has both positive and negative implications 
for serious scholars of intelligence. On the positive side, the sheer volume 
and diversity of data available presents a considerable opportunity for 
conducting research. Unfortunately, a number of factors militate against 
this being an easy job. Before assessing these factors it is important to get 
a feel for the literature as a whole. To do this it is necessary to identify 
certain categories and to make some qualitative assertions about them. 
The literature may be broken down into about seven separate 
groups. Only one specifically sets out to be fiction, though several of the 
others include fictive elements. The fiction group includes both feature 
films and "spy fiction."7 Both have long histories and represent 
burgeoning genres in their own right. While, of course, they vary con-
siderably in quality, orientation, and their capacity to entertain, spy 
writers, as David Stafford has noted: 
. . . are always more than entertainers. They present us 
with unique orientations about nations and their place 
in a complex and dangerous world. If we care to look, 
these commentators of the silent game can inform as 
well as amuse us.* 
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There is good reason for this. Many writers have inside knowledge of the 
looking-glass world.' It is not surprising therefore that novels and films 
have tended to focus attention on particular organizations and to 
glamorize certain occupations at the expense of others.10 But such mat-
ters alone do not explain the unquestionable popularity of genres. In 
Tinker, Taylor, Soldier, Spy, as John Oseth has noted, Le Carré allows 
one of his characters to muse aloud. 
[A] nation's intelligence service is the only real measure 
of its political health, the one true expression of its col-
lective subconscious. Perhaps as no other national in-
stitution, it embodies the societal psyche, reflecting in-
terwoven images of national "self" and "alien" 
other." 
Stafford in his historical analysis of spy fiction from William Le Queux 
down to the present day confirms not only that British spy writers began 
to flourish when they could strike a chord of national vulnerability but 
has argued that the same is currently holding true for those in the Soviet 
Union and in the United States. Both, he argues, are now perceived to be 
declining empires. And it is the spy novel which fulfills the need of the 
public culture for patriotic reassertion and the denial of imperial 
decline.12 
A second category may be termed "official documents." The 
amount of data in these varies from state to state and from period to 
period.1 * Their value also varies as well. "Official reports" which form 
one sub-set of documents, generally present "safe" versions of affairs.14 
Readers therefore need to be aware of what is included in such 
documents and should hypothesize what is left out." By contrast, 
documents prepared for internal consumption may be much more reveal-
ing. 
A third category may be classified as "semi-official documents." 
This group is largely comprised of autobiographic studies which have a 
degree of official sponsorship.16 It can be argued that this group should 
include some of the fictional literature. For example, some have posited 
that the novels of E. Howard Hunt were intended to encourage support 
for CIA covert operations.11 
In counterpoise to this group are the "unsanctioned accounts." 
These accounts are provided by authors with insider knowledge who for 
one reason or another want to reveal perceived deficiencies in the system. 
In both the United Kingdom and the United States such authors have 
routinely found themselves on the receiving end of court actions to curb 
publication or to limit disclosure." 
A fifth group concerns reports and documentaries in the media. 
Two categories are normally implicitly presented by members of news 
organizations. One may be termed reactive reporting. This occurs where 
news is received in an unsolicited fashion, as it were by accident rather 
than by design. Such is the case with wire service items for example. The 
other is frequently referred to as investigative journalism." Such activity 
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is perceived to be proactive in the sense that it is initiated by reporters of 
their own will. As Chibnall has argued, the practice: 
gives journalists the sense that they are autonomous ac-
tors in touch with the finest traditions of their craft-
crusaders in the cause of truth, protectors of the 
people's freedoms rather than mere functionaries of a 
production process which panders to consumer wants.20 
Richard Ericson, in a recent major empirical study, has questioned both 
the authenticity of the practice and the existence of the dichotomy. For 
him the reporting of news rests upon the provision of knowledge by 
sources. It differs only in their location and intention. Thus, journalists 
are not manufacturers: they are rather constructors. They organize and 
shape the knowledge that comes to them into a discourse.11 This inter-
pretation is important when it comes to understanding the role that jour-
nalists and sources play in reporting about security and intelligence af-
fairs. It points to the need for researchers to pay particularly close atten-
tion to both the content and manner in which material is released for 
public consumption.22 
It is probably true to say that each of the last three groups has been 
written for the popular culture rather than a more specific audience. In 
general terms these versions have also tended to focus on particular 
organizations and occupations and not on others.23 
The literature that comprises the two final groups has been 
specifically prepared for scholarly audiences. By far the larger of the two 
groups, and the one with the longer pedigree, is comprised of special in-
terest studies. These tend to be of more interest to one scholarly 
discipline (or even sub-sections of it), to one country, or to specific types 
of organizations.24 The other is comprised of studies which have attemp-
ted to see the big picture, and to cross disciplinary, organizational and 
national boundaries." 
II. GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE LITERATURE: 
Over the last twenty years two schools—the American and the 
British—have come to dominate the discussion of intelligence matters at 
nearly every level. In the last year or so with the shift in focus to 
theoretical and definitional issues it has become popular to question this 
dominance on grounds that the perspectives produced are parochial and 
not capable of holding universal value.26 To date this challenge has not 
got very far. 
Three factors have thwarted the development of a new frame. First, 
many authors have found themselves psychologically boxed into par-
ticular ways of looking at the central issues. This has been caused by their 
investment in dominant cultural orientations and particular disciplinary 
approaches. Thus both American and British writers have tended to 
focus their work within the context of the primary threats (past and pre-
sent) that have challenged their particular political cultures while 
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individual authors have found it difficult to avoid the disciplinary 
perspectives and methodologies immediately available to them.27 
Secondly, the "new wave" of thinkers on intelligence has been headed by 
academics from either the smaller, less prestigious universities or from 
the non-traditional disciplines. And finally, authors who have advocated 
a comparative framework as a necessary next step have not necessarily 
met with the success they intended or others thought was their intent. In 
Ken Robertson's case the pinpointing of differences between British and 
American views of intelligence and the suggestion of how both could be 
improved has, in fact, focussed attention back on the dominant frame, 
albeit an improved one." The motives behind Roy Godson's attempt at 
comparative work, Comparing Foreign Intelligence need to be closely 
scrutinized as he has a major investment in what has become the 
established frame for looking at intelligence. Though the individual 
authors make very valuable contributions, the book as a whole is really 
neither about foreign intelligence nor about making comparisons. While 
dialogue between the British and American voices is maintained, those 
concerning the Soviet Union and the Third World remain muted. This is 
largely a function of the order of the articles and the positioning of the 
book and the articles by Godson." 
The result is that a "Mercator projection" of intelligence, one that 
looks at the problem primarily within the context of East-West confron-
tations centred in Europe, is maintained. All other dimensions remain 
peripheral. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE: 
The development of the intelligence community in the United States 
is a modern phenomenon. It is epitomized by the birth and development 
of the Central Intelligence Agency immediately after the Second World 
War.30 Perhaps more than in any other democracy, the American in-
telligence system has been open to public scrutiny and the public political 
process.31 Emphasis in the literature can be seen to waver between 
periods of concentration on propriety procedures and on organizational 
efficacy. Harry Ransom, in fact, has argued that intelligence functions 
have been regulated according to fluctuations in the domestic and inter-
national political milieu.32 Thus, writers have tended to describe the in-
telligence community according to a variety of discrete periods: the Early 
Years, the Dulles Era (1953-61), the Kennedy-Johnson Years (1961-69), 
the End of CIA Immunity and Legitimacy (1970-74), the Reform Era 
under Ford and Carter (1975-1980), and the subsequent counter-reform 
period.33 
There is little doubt that the 1970s saw an unprecedented increase in 
interest on intelligence matters. Most critical observers of such affairs 
agree that 1975 was the watershed year.34 Prior to that time there had 
been only a limited number of works published about either the structure 
and functions of the U.S. intelligence community or the theory of in-
telligence and much of it lacked sound evidence or concrete examples.39 
A number of factors had worked against publication. Of critical 
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importance was the fact that governments cloaked intelligence activities 
in official secrecy. This was particular true of domestic matters. At the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover kept information 
clamped even within the bureaucracy. Responding in 1971 to an invita-
tion to defend the FBI's role at a conference at Princeton he argued that: 
Basically our position is that the FBI need tailor no 
special "defense" of its own for this occasion. The basic 
facts on how the FBI is organized and how it discharges 
its duties have been so well known for so long, and to so 
many responsible persons, that they are obvious to all 
except those who are so blind that they do not wish to 
see." 
Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s it was not the practice for former in-
telligence professionals to write their memoirs, though as Mark Lowen-
thal notes a number of writers wrote "from experience, but not of ex-
periences." It was the amendment to the Freedom of Information Act 
(1974) which provided a new level of access to knowledge, the Vietnam 
War, the Watergate Break-in, the change in relationships with the Soviet 
Union, and one might also add, the death of Hoover, which provided the 
political environment for change by focussing attention on the role of the 
Presidency. It was in this context that Victor Marchetti, a former CIA 
official, and co-author John Marks published The CIA and the Cult of 
Intelligence in 1974. This was to be a book that changed national at-
titudes. Hitherto American intelligence agencies had tended to be 
respected but not well known. Thereafter they dwelt in the public 
spotlight and imagination. The book indicated that the CIA concen-
trated its efforts not on intelligence activities against the Soviet Union 
but on covert actions against the small and weak nations of the Third 
World. There it conducted dirty tricks and supported factions it 
favoured with money and arms, not altogether successfully." In all pro-
bability it spurred Seymour Hersh to write a series of articles that ap-
peared in the New York Times in December 1974. These revealed that the 
CIA had violated its congressional charter by spying on Americans." 
These articles opened the flood gates of change. With them the era of 
trust between the intelligence community and Congress, on the one hand, 
and American citizens, on the other, abruptly ended. In its place "a new 
season of inquiry" was created on Capital Hill.40 Ransom has claimed 
that it was these articles coupled with the CIA's complicity in the 
Watergate scandal that started the: 
new era in U.S. Intelligence history, initiating a still-
continuing avalanche of disclosures about assassination 
plots, drug testing, mail opening etc. and of published 
materials on the intelligence system.41 
He has broken the post-1974 American literature down into four 
categories: personal memoirs, whistle-blowing exposés, social science 
analytical works and congressional and executive branch studies.42 Each of 
these bodies of literature needs to be seen at two levels: for the political 
purposes they served and for their long-term analytical contribution. 
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During 1975, the so-called 'year of intelligence', four congressional or 
executive branch studies were completed. Early in January President Ford 
initiated his own investigation under the chairmanship of his Vice-
President, Nelson Rockefeller. This was frequently interpreted to be an at-
tempt to preempt a more hostile investigation by Congress.45 Nevertheless, 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives went ahead with the 
establishment of investigative committees.44 Of the two the Pike Commit-
tee in the House was looked upon with greater suspicion than the Senate's 
Church Committee.** This had much to do with the attitude of the com-
mittees and their chairmen. Pike was confrontational in approach: the 
Church Committee less so. Both in their own way achieved some success. 
Each in turn led to permanent select committees which have published a 
continuous stream of information ever since. As a research tool the work 
of the Church Committee is more extensive and probably more useful. In 
addition to these three investigatory bodies the Murphy Commission also 
provided studies on intelligence matters. Because these were provided 
without the benefit of either the Pike and Church committee reports or 
that of the Rockefeller Commission, they tend to be more abstract. They, 
nevertheless, constitute a useful, long-term source of information.46 
The committees of inquiry gave sustenance to a number of different 
types of writers. Though they had different political motives and objec-
tives in mind they may be grouped together because their works are all 
essentially polemical in style. The group contains works by whistle-
blowers, axe grinders and activists. The works of Philip Agee, Frank 
Snepp, John Stockwell and Joseph Smith all provide views of the CIA 
from the inside. Nevertheless, these whistle-blowing antics themselves 
differ considerably. At one end of the spectrum the disaffected Agee tries 
to damage the organization permanently by revealing the names of its 
operatives.47 In the middle Snepp and Stockwell provide unauthorized 
criticism of the operational efficacy of the agency.41 And at the other 
Smith's approved memoir alludes to the organization's moral decay.4' 
The works of the Centre for National Security Studies, Frank Donner of 
the American Civil Liberties Association, and David Wise are examples 
of axe-grinders. They each focus on abuses without really placing them 
in context." The collection of essays in Dirty Work: The CIA in Western 
Europe and Uncloaking the CIA are representative of the New-Left 
abolitionist movement.'1 
Under circumstances where many insiders shared the view that 
abuses had not been put in a proper context, it is not surprising that 
many former intelligence officers felt obliged to set the record straight by 
writing memoirs." Ken Robertson, in fact, has argued that it is difficult, 
if not impossible to prevent committed employees from responding to 
such criticism when they believe that their professional conduct and per-
sonal integrity are so severely questioned." Thus these memoirs need to 
be seen as a rebuttal to the extensive criticisms of the mid-1970s. It is to 
be expected, therefore, that they exhibit a certain commonality of theme. 
Robertson has identified four points. First, critics had failed to com-
prehend the international political realities of the Cold War of the 1950s 
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and 1960s. Secondly, they had failed to understand that responsibility 
for the faults and errors lay just as much with the executive as it did with 
the agencies concerned. Thirdly, there was a general lack of appreciation 
that the intelligence community was not one big monolith but a group of 
enterprises that had emerged under a particular institutional and 
bureaucratic climate. And lastly, the memoirs pointed to the 
anachronism of the criticism itself by indicating the way the standards of 
the 1970s were applied to the period before détente." 
And finally, the investigations of the mid-1970s acted as a catalyst 
for more comprehensive and more rounded academic studies. For the 
first time there was harder data to go on and a lively debate to be enjoin-
ed. In this milieu a small number of important academic studies were 
conducted and published. Lawrence Freedman's study, U.S. Intelligence 
and the Soviet Strategic Threat, is significant for a variety of reasons. 
Most important, perhaps, is his finding that external threats are as much 
determined by the existing bureaucratic culture as they are by the provi-
sion of intelligence estimates." Also of significance are the works by 
John Elliff, Richard Morgan and Äthan Theoharis which deal with the 
domestic theatre." The weakness, however, in many of the academic 
studies of this period is that they lack an adequate theory of intelligence, 
a matter not altogether surprising given the lack of comprehensive 
knowledge of the intelligence system at the time. 
In the period since these early academic studies a continued cleavage 
may be perceived in how academics have viewed the role of intelligence in 
the United States. This cleavage has been conceptualized in a variety of 
ways. Robertson, for example, has seen it in clear-cut terms of Idealists 
versus Realists. For him neither entertains the interests of the other. His 
Idealists have concentrated primarily on ethics and democratic theory 
and have focussed on such issues as accountability and constitutional law 
and the morality of intervention and covert action. In stark contrast his 
Realists focus on organizational performance." Perhaps a more useful 
view is to consider the literature in terms of the orientation of writers 
towards the Soviet Union. Such is the perspective of Loch Johnson and 
others who see clear points of demarcation between authors along a con-
tinuum. At one end the Soviets are "aggressive expansionists," at the 
other more "defensive opportunists." The perception of the threat in 
these terms makes only zero-sum activities possible at one end, while at 
the other shared-sum activities can be entertained." 
Johnson suggests that the works of the National Strategy Informa-
tion Centre and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, which he 
refers to as the "Georgetown perspective," epitomize the zero-sum 
orientation. Furthermore, he argues that their interpretations of and 
recommendations for intelligence requirements follow from this view." 
Whether or not one agrees with this view of the Consortium's work, it 
has certainly been responsible for shifting the emphasis in the debate 
over intelligence away from propriety procedures—accountability, 
charters, legislation, oversight mechanisms, etc.—to issues of efficacy 
and to concentrate the arguments in the elemental categories. The central 
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argument which runs through their seven volumes is as follows. The in-
telligence process needs to be seen conceptually as the integration and 
coordination of four key elements: analysis, collection, counter-
intelligence and covert operations. A weakness in any one of the elements 
threatens the whole. Good intelligence is a prerequisite if America is to 
maintain its position in the world. Consequently, the United States needs 
a full-service intelligence capacity.60 Whether one agrees with the Con-
sortium's view of the world or their political objectives is unimportant; 
what is significant is that their work has encouraged an important step 
forward analytically." Hitherto intelligence problems had not been 
treated at all systematically. Instead, the committees and their critics had 
examined aspects of the intelligence community's work in isolation and 
had advocated changes to collection processes without giving due con-
sideration to the activities of foreign intelligence agencies and the range 
of threats that they posed.*2 Henceforth it would be necessary to view the 
implications of policy and structural changes on the whole system not 
just the particular organization or activity under consideration. 
Whether one agrees about the influence of the Consortium's work 
or not the literature of the 1980s has been of a much more sophisticated 
nature. On the one hand it has been much more conceptually oriented. 
And on the other it has been much more linked. There are now a whole 
range of studies which deal with intelligence failures, surprise, deception, 
and the policy process63 and regulatory control.64 Far from failing to en-
join issues of propriety and efficacy, one now finds writers touching on 
both sides of the original divide.65 
IV. THE BRITISH SCHOOL: 
The British literature on intelligence is dramatically different from 
that of the United States in many ways. Its espionage fiction, as David j 
Stafford has shown, goes back to the Victorian period.66 Its scholarly 
and popular non-fictional work, as with the American literature, is of 
more recent origin. This delay has not so much been caused by a lack of 
interest in the subject, but by positive efforts on the part of successive 
British governments. During the Second World War considerable efforts 
were made to impress on the British public the need for secrecy and the 
avoidance of idle chatter which could help the enemy. Such attitudes 
were not allowed to wane after the war. To the contrary, efforts were 
made to encourage and enforce enclosure on security and intelligence 
matters. Where the citizens of other democracies gained access to infor-
mation legislation, the British government retained and used the punitive 
powers contained in the Official Secrets Act.61 Where journalists in 
North America could publish what they could obtain, the British press 
muzzled themselves with a "voluntary" system of publication restraint.61 
Where foreign archives were opened, Britain's remained tightly shut 
under the thirty-year rule. 
This official view of security and intelligence matters remains to this 
day.6* Governments, regardless of stripe, have avoided inquiries 
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wherever possible. Where they have been deemed them necessary the 
hearings have largely been held in private. And where their reports have 
been made public, they have been short and to the point. Seldom has 
much information concerning the structures, functions and interrelation-
ships of the organizations making up the British intelligence community 
been released.70 The impact of this governmental policy has been to make 
the study of intelligence matters unattractive for political scientists and 
only sparingly so for historians. 
Despite these adverse conditions four aspects of security and in-
telligence work have attracted the attention of non-fictional authors. 
These aspects to some degree may be seen as point and counterpoint and 
as disparate entities. There has been a never-ending stream of books 
about the betrayal of British secrets to the Soviets. These have been of 
two general types: those concerning strategic or defense matters, such as 
atomic weapons secrets,71 and those relating to British intelligence itself. 
This latter group has been by far the most consuming and has created the 
greatest degree of soul-searching. At least one author has suggested that 
the search for "moles" has taken on the proportions of a national obses-
sion.72 Certainly, the continued reiteration of the problem and elabora-
tion of it, has created very severe difficulties for the special Anglo-
American intelligence relationship.73 Studies concerning moles have, in 
fact, taken two tacks. Initially, there was the unfolding of the story. The 
purpose in many of these works was to bring about a public enquiry to 
establish once and for all that British security was no longer vulnerable.74 
More recently, an attempt has been made to concentrate on the subver-
sive nature of the so-called "Cambridge Comintern" and to focus on the 
moral decay within the establishment.7' With a few notable exceptions76 
the so-called "mole studies" have been conducted by journalists and 
popular authors, rather than those with a scholarly audience in mind. 
By contrast, the second group of studies has been written by former 
intelligence experts or by members of the academic community. It is 
these studies which constitute for Cameron Watt the so-called emerging 
British school of intelligence studies.77 They are in counterpart to the 
"mole studies" in important respects. In large part these studies are 
historical in nature. Whereas the "mole studies" focus on security 
failures and security weaknesses, the more academic studies initially con-
centrated on either intelligence coups or the potential benefits of in-
telligence. It is not surprising, therefore, that these studies began to be 
published during the 1970s when criticism of and demands for accoun-
tability of the Security Service were extensive. 
Prior to the 1970s only a few books had been published by insiders 
and but one of these had been in any way controversial.7* A threshold 
book, however, was The Double Cross System in the War of 1939-1945. 
Written by Sir John Masterman, a well-known Oxford historian, the 
book started life as an official MI5 archival record of the XX Commit« 
tee's successful deception work prior to the D-Day landings. Masterman 
had tried unsuccessfully to obtain permission to publish the document on 
at least five occasions over a period of nearly twenty years. Approval 
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finally came in 1972 after he had threatened to publish abroad.7' But the 
publication some two years later of F.W. Winterbotham's The Ultra 
Secret was to open the flood-gates of change. This work not only record-
ed how German codes were broken during the war but catalogued the 
enormous benefits of signals intelligence that resulted to the Allies.10 
Subsequent to these insider accounts a broader range of historical 
studies appeared. These studies had two starting points. First, the new 
climate, albeit a reluctant one, on Whitehall's part towards intelligence 
provided incentives for academics to pursue new avenues of access to 
historical data.'1 These, in turn, allowed for important revisions to be 
made to certain critical events." Secondly, the American and Israeli ex-
periences with and literatures on surprise and intelligence failures were of 
considerable import to historians." To these were added Britain's own 
experience at the hands of the Argentineans in the Falklands." Starting 
from the general premise that good intelligence was critical to the Allied 
victory in the Second World War15 these studies attempted to analyze the 
state of intelligence, warts and all, immediately prior to and during 
points of crisis." In the process these historical studies provided the 
"missing dimension" to much twentieth-century diplomatic, military 
and political history." 
A third group either concerns the "troubles" in Ireland directly or 
owes much to them. These studies need to be seen on at least two dif-
ferent levels. AU too frequently events in Ireland are perceived by 
authors and readers alike to be a central feature of Irish history or to 
constitute a rich source of material to satiate the ever present desire for 
news and views of terrorism. But such interpretations give the political 
violence there too short a shrift. Studies of Irish terrorism and British 
responses to it are significant for three other reasons. First, because the 
"troubles" extend over a very long period of time and span both war and 
peace, they offer a blunt contrast to studies of intelligence which concen-
trate on wartime exploits or preparation for war." Secondly, they offer a 
different way of looking at intelligence from either the "mole" or "war 
studies." While the "war studies" focussed on the strengths or 
weaknesses of particular elements of intelligence (signals intelligence, 
scientific intelligence, special operations, military intelligence, etc.), the 
"mole studies" concentrated largely on the weaknesses of security and 
governmental response to penetrations, spying and defections. By con-
trast, the Irish studies provide an opportunity to identify the linkages 
between the various elements of the British national security apparatus 
and to show how they function. Thus we see in several treatments how 
the army, the police, the Special Branch, the SAS, and both the Security 
Service and Secret Intelligence Service all work together." And finally, 
we also see in a number of other studies the lengths to which a 
democratic government like that of Britian will go in peacetime to solve 
security problems.90 In this regard it is also worth recalling that different 
traditions of policing developed in Ireland than on the mainland and that 
it was events in Ireland which created the need for the Special Branch in 
London more than a hundred years ago.91 
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The Irish studies are particularly important insofar as they indicate 
that "the troubles" have gone through several specific phases in recent 
years. As the rate of conflict increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
the British government responded with the introduction, on an ex-
perimental basis, of counterinsurgency tactics. The strategy for such 
practices had been laid out in a semi-official book by a future 
Commander-in-Chief United Kingdom Land Forces, then Brigadier, 
Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and 
Peacekeeping.91 Kitson based this work on his own extensive practical ex-
perience in Britain's Asian and African colonies, on earlier British 
counter-insurgency campaigns in Palestine and Ireland, and on the 
works of a number of earlier authors.93 Later the government decided to 
follow a policy of "criminalization" or "Ulsterization." This policy 
reasserted the premise that terrorist acts should be considered as criminal 
offenses to be dealt with by the police and prosecuted in the courts. 
While, criminalization can be construed as a carefully crafted term to 
avoid acknowledging that a counterinsurgency campaign was being 
fought within the United Kingdom,94 the process did have very signifi-
cant consequences in terms of who should play lead roles and how pro-
secution should be achieved. In 1977, for example, the army's hitherto 
supreme authority in security matters was removed and given over to the 
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.95 A further result is 
that Northern Ireland is now one of the most heavily policed societies in 
the free world.96 Another is that criminalization changed the emphasis 
from broadly based counterinsurgency methods which were frequently 
perceived to be counterproductive, to more finely tuned initiatives." 
All too frequently the police and policing are not included within the 
rubric of the intelligence community and its functions. This state of af-
fairs stems in large part from the belief that a clear distinction can be 
drawn in democratic societies, particularly those that owe the mainstays 
of their political philosophy to England, between criminal and security 
intelligence. This distinction is normally perceived to be two-edged. On 
the one hand the objectives of the exercise are said to be different; securi-
ty intelligence being used to thwart threats while criminal intelligence is 
thought to be used only for law enforcement purposes. And on the other 
there is said to be clear points of demarcation on organizational lines bet-
ween police forces and intelligence agencies. Perhaps the most important 
aspect of the Irish studies is that they illustrate the importance of the 
police and policing techniques to internal security procedures and in-
telligence practices in Britain. In particular, they illustrate the degree to 
which the police have taken on a counterinsurgency role on both the 
mainland and in Northern Ireland.91 
While this fact has largely gone unnoticed by the historical establish-
ment it has not gone unobserved by writers toward the left in Britain.99 
The pioneering work in this regard was provided by Tony Bunyan, Tom 
Bowden, Carol Ackroyd et al, and the many contributors to State 
Research.™0 Though State Research has long since perished, the tradition 
has been continued in the work of Mike Brogden, Duncan Campbell, 
Martin Kettle, Sarah Manwaring-White, Peter Hain, Paddy Hillyard and 
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Phil Scraton, to name but a few,'01 and in the pages of the New 
Statesman, Time Out, and New Society. A central feature of their argu-
ment has been that the police, the Special Branch, MI5, the Secret In-
telligence Service, the SAS, the military and private security need to be 
seen as being structurally all of a piece when it comes to their intelligence 
function and the maintaining of order in Britain.102 The implications of 
this assertion for controlling intelligence are awesome as they imply a 
need to impose controls functionally as well as structurally. 
The literature on the "political police" and the police more general-
ly can be seen to be connected to two important developments: the 
growth of literature on governmental secrecy and the demand for greater 
accountability of the coercive arms of the state. Whereas in the United 
States the demand for greater accountability focussed on the Central In-
telligence Agency and its activities at home and abroad, the demand in 
Britain was channeled towards the police. In this respect it has met with a 
modicum of success. But efforts to bring the intelligence agencies under 
firmer and more public control have failed miserably. 
V. THE LITERATURE ON SOVIET INTELLIGENCE 
AND SECURITY SERVICES: 
All too frequently the political, economic and social structures of 
the Soviet regime are treated as if they are the products of the Bolshevik 
revolution alone. Little or no consideration is given to the possibility that 
these structures may owe much to the political culture of Russia under 
the Tsars.103 Interestingly, it may be argued that the structure and func-
tion of the contemporary Soviet intelligence apparatus owes much to its 
pre-revolutionary forebears. A clear point of linkage can, in fact, be seen 
between the modes of policing apparent under the Tsars and those 
available to the Commissars of the new Soviet State.104 
The lack of historical perspective so prevalent in much of the 
literature reflects in many ways dominant Western attitudes toward and 
perceptions of the Soviet Union since the Second World War. Cold War 
blinkers have frequently been responsible for excluding from view ex-
planations for Soviet behaviour based on centuries of Russian ex-
perience.101 This lack of historical perspective has been compounded by 
American attitudes towards their own intelligence and security agencies 
and the purposes they serve. Intelligence for North American politicians 
has traditionally been something that was undesirable at best and 
something they would rather not know about at worst. Gentlemen, in the 
supposed words of Henry Stimson, simply did not read each other's 
mail. But such a view has not traditionally been shared by other political 
cultures whether they be of a democratic stripe or otherwise. The secret 
police were an important feature of the Hapsburg monarchy under 
Joseph II (1741-90). Here their surveillance practices were based on the 
best of motives.106 The French police also have a tradition of political 
watching and listening at home and abroad that dates back to the 
Cabinet Noir of Richelieu and beyond. This system of "high policing" 
was developed and considerably extended after the 18th Brumaire by 
Fouché.107 Policy spying was also a feature of the nineteenth century 
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Ottoman Empire, though here there were no paternalistic overtones.108 It 
is not surprising therefore to find that the secret police in Russia have an 
equally long tradition and a rich literature.109 
The contemporary literature concerning the Soviet intelligence 
system has been grouped in a variety of ways. The American authors of a 
recent bibliography, for example, have used five main headings: 
bibliographic and reference works; Russian/Soviet acounts; defec-
tor/first hand accounts; secondary accounts; and the U.S. government 
documents.110 Such a grouping simplifies the job of constructing a 
bibliography but is not particular helpful in making sense of the 
literature as a whole. Texts need to be perceived in terms of their value as 
primary or secondary sources and in terms of the political perspectives 
they adopt, Soviet documents—like all official papers—should not be 
taken at their face value. They need to be seen as carefully scripted of-
ficial reports which encourage particular perceptions. Likewise, 
materials produced by defectors must be considered in the same way as 
hostile witnesses are treated in a court of law until their veracity is pro-
ven. Secondary sources, that is accounts provided by non-Russians, also 
vary considerably in their perspective. They too need to be seen in terms 
of whether they constitute "zero-sum" (Soviets as aggressive expan-
sionists) or "shared-sum" (Soviets as defensive opportunists) interpreta-
tions. Even U.S. Government documents need to be viewed in this man-
ner because American views of the Soviets have changed over time with 
shifts in congressional majorities and the presidency. Secondary ac-
counts also need to be seen in terms of the type of experience and exper-
tise that the author has had. Thus the sorts of topics touched upon in 
journalistic approaches may be quite different from those covered by 
former professional intelligence officers or academics. It should also be 
stressed that the accounts of defectors need to be considered in this con-
text. In the academic literature the author's discipline should also be con-
sidered. Likewise, his or her country of origin may be of considerable 
significance. 
Other types of categorization are equally significant. For example, 
whether the approach constitutes a structural or functional analysis is ex-
tremely important. So too is whether it is more concerned with internal 
or external matters or whether it focusses only on a specific function or 
not. 
The English language literature on Soviet intelligence matters is 
clearly dominated by American sources and by defectors who now live in 
the United States. The bulk of the material focusses on the role and func-
tions of the KGB in its capacity as a foreign intelligence agency. While 
emphasis has traditionally been placed on human intelligence capacities 
this has recently been supplemented by writings that focus on support for 
terrorist organizations111, the deception of western intelligence agencies 
and the governments,112 active measures generally, and particular types 
of intelligence gathering such as that which concentrates on scientific and 
technical information and high technology."3 Also, other agencies such 
as the GRU"4 and the International Department115 have come under 
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closer scrutiny. This picture is a composite of the changing nature of 
perceived threats, the preponderance of available data and the applica-
tion of accepted ways of looking at the intelligence world in the West. 
But is it accurate or is it just the world we want to see? 
It may be argued that analyses of Soviet politics and government 
have often been flawed in important respects. While the role of the party 
has correctly been given due prominence, mechanisms for maintaining 
party power and status have often been dealth with in too summary a 
fashion."* This is particularly true of the state's security police, or to 
give it its more correct title, state security. This situation may be partly 
explained by two important and interrelated facts. On the one hand 
analysts have often examined the problem through the same lenses that 
have been used in the West to explain Western intelligence and security 
functions and structures. Such conceptual frameworks, as some authors 
have noted, may not be at all appropriate."7 And on the other writers 
have had to rely on the preponderance of data that is available. Together 
these factors have encouraged a view of the Soviet apparatus which 
overemphasizes the foreign intelligence role and underplays the security 
aspects."1 
The recent contribution by John Dziak has attempted to redress the 
balance and to reconceptualize the problem."9 Rather than positing that 
the USSR has the world's largest or best intelligence service as other 
authors have done, he suggests that it has an essentially security-focused 
system. Furthermore, he argues that it provides the foremost and longest 
running example of the "counter intelligence tradition." He considers 
that an "overarching concern" with internal and external enemies of the 
state and a compulsive desire to rid itself of such threats lie at the root of 
this tradition. Under such circumstancs he concludes that domestic 
security quite naturally takes pride of place while foreign intelligence ac-
tivities become largely an external projection of state security. It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find that Dziak considers the essential features 
of the counter-intelligence tradition—provocation, penetration, fabrica-
tion, diversion, agents of influence, clandestine work, disinformation, 
"wet affairs", direct action and combination activities—to be long 
established. Seen in this light the security and intelligence apparatus is 
essentially a policing system designed both to maintain a specific concep-
tion of order at home and abroad which has been defined by the party to 
protect the party itself. 
VI. INTELLIGENCE AND PARIAH STATES: 
The use of the term "pariah" to describe states which pursue 
policies about which there is widespread international or regional disap-
proval had its origins in the 1970s. Though many of the states then so 
labelled have long since re-entered the mainstream as the result of chang-
ing political fortunes and attitudes, South Africa and Israel remain as 
regional if not international pariahs. 
While one may argue about the validity of such a controversial con-
cept for international relations purposes, the notion of pariah states is 
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useful for the study of security and intelligence matters. Though initially 
shaped to be in the Western mold both Israel and South Africa present 
dramatically different models of intelligence both from each other and 
from other western states. This has largely to do with the nature of the 
threat presented and the need for regional self-reliance. Historically, the 
threat against Israel has been seen as being primarily external and of a 
very serious nature. Unlike other states Israel has never enjoyed the lux-
ury of being able to lose a war. In its case such an event has always been 
unthinkable as it implied not only losing the war but the demise of Israel 
as a state as well. Of course, the presence of Arabs living within Israel's 
boundaries has also constituted a threat in the eyes of some. Until recent-
ly, however, this has not been seen as being of major proportions.120 But 
Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and the In-
tifada are now changing the situation. 
It is not surprising that the study of intelligence in and about Israel 
has focussed until recently on two dimensions—the heroic role and in-
telligence failures. Perhaps more than any other states's the Israeli in-
telligence community epitomizes intelligence as hero. This heroic role has 
been encouraged by the state in three particular ways. First, it has used 
deliberate disinformation and propaganda to encourage this perception. 
Second, as part of this campaign it has gone out of its way to give 
novelists and film makers official access to senior intelligence 
personriel.121 This, it should be noted, has occurred in a state which is 
arguably more obsessive about secrecy than Britain. And third, and 
perhaps most important, Israeli intelligence has a truly heroic tradition. 
Its history is filled with daring exploits. To quote the words of Le Carré: 
"Israeli intelligence is a sandbox. If it works they do it."1" 
The result of this heroic tradition is that Israeli intelligence has ac-
quired, rightly or wrongly, a reputation, often shared by public and pro-
fessionals alike, for excellence. The popular literature documents their 
exploits and details their successes.'2J And on occasion it even subscribes 
to the singular importance of intelligence in saving the state.124 
The surprise attack suffered by Israel in 1973 and the increased 
academic interest in intelligence generally has encouraged more balanced 
academic studies. These have focussed on two specific aspects—the ef-
ficacy of organizations and the problem of intelligence failures. These 
studies can be divided into three distinct periods. Recent hebrew studies 
of the period immediately prior to 1948 have indicated that the level of 
sophistication achieved by the Jewish Yishuv in the areas of political and 
military intelligence, special operations and propaganda was, in fact, 
very substantial.121 Likewise, recent studies of military intelligence have 
shown that the aura of infallibility which characterized the period after 
the 1967, was not present prior to the 19S6 Sinai campaign. In fact, Ray-
mond Cohen has shown that a series of intelligence failures in 1953 and 
1954 had shaken the confidence of service quite severely.1 " The failure 
of intelligence to alert Israeli authorities about Arab intentions prior to 
the Yom Kippur War has been responsible for much more circumspect 
analyses by both Israelis and Jewish writers of other nationalities. These 
67 
Spring 1989 
have concentrated on how surprise can be avoided, the political realities 
of intelligence, and on the value of estimates.'" Much of this work has 
been completed, published or presented in North America and in this 
sense has influenced and forms part of American scholarship. 
In South Africa the focus of attention is reversed. Support (albeit 
often covert) of white, Western governments has limited the capacity of 
South Africa's black neighbors to pose a major external threat. Within 
South Africa the always potentially violent black majority pose a never 
ending threat and challenge to the state. 
Though much external support for black South Africans has been 
voiced throughout the English-speaking world and beyond, little 
academic work has been done either within South Africa or outside to 
understand how the South African government uses its police, in-
telligence agencies and military to thwart opposition. This deficiency can 
only partly be explained. Obviously, the current regime's levels of 
secrecy, severe restrictions on the media, and harsh levels of treatment 
for those who break the Apartheid rules or breach public order make 
working on such issues extremely difficult for those who want to live in 
South Africa. But the lack of work by foreign scholars, particularly for 
the early years or in such non-operational areas as accountability and 
control, is harder to fathom.1" 
Literature on the South African intelligence and security matters is 
scant indeed. What exists can be broken down into three small groups. 
By far the largest is that concerning legal matters. Here the emphasis is 
not just on the propriety of state organizations but more broadly on the 
legitimacy of the Apartheid regime.129 A second and connected literature 
concerns civil violence and policing reforms."0 And finally there is a 
limited literature on the workings of the secret police."1 
VII. INTELLIGENCE IN NON-WESTERN COUNTRIES 
While there is a paucity of English-language intelligence literature 
on non-Western countries, the extant material is of considerable impor-
tance from an analytical point of view. Whereas intelligence work is fre-
quently perceived in the West to be a twentieth-century phenomenon"2, 
this is not the case in the Orient."3 There writers acknowledge the in-
fluence of the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu who wrote The Strategy on War 
more than 2450 years ago, and point to the long established tradition and 
employment of secret societies."' 
A number of observers have suggested that the Japanese possess 
particular cultural traits that have had a major influence on the develop-
ment of their intelligence systems. In his examination of the period from 
1894 to 1922 Ian Nish has argued that besides their traditional reputation 
for analysis and observation the Japanese had become intrepid travellers 
who were full of curiosity and energy. Their high sense of loyalty to their 
community and to their nation made them reserved, reticent and 
secretive."5 Some have even described the Japanese as having a "genius 
for secrecy.""4 Yet J.W.M. Chapman has noted, however, that 
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Japanese traits did not always affect intelligence positively. He suggests 
that there appears: 
to be a cycle in which the Japanese assiduously learn 
about those aspects of their environment that they deem 
to be essential to a maintenance of domestic harmony, 
engage in a hard-headed, rational and painstaking 
analysis of external conditions, but sacrifice its conclu-
sions on the altar of national sentiment and on 
judgements of what other, unconsulted parties will 
tolerate.137 
This point is confirmed by Michael Barnhart in his analysis of Japanese 
intelligence before the Second World War. He has argued that despite 
high quality information Japanese leaders relied on their own uninform-
ed notions of how potential enemies would respond to Japanese 
policies.1" For the post-war period Richard Deacon has argued that 
these traits have both encouraged an intense desire for all kinds of 
knowledge and developed a capacity for turning a current disadvantage 
into a future advantage. Thus because post-war terms prevented expen-
diture on offensive military equipment and conventional western types of 
intelligence gathering, Japanese intelligence developed in different direc-
tions. Deacon suggests that these developments reflect a conception of 
intelligence which is not sinister and which does not incorporate es-
pionage as it is perceived in the West. 
Japan, with its passionate emphasis on the acquisition 
of knowledge, may pave the way to a more peaceful and 
eminently sensible concept of secret service in the 
future. All the signs are there for those who wish to read 
them. Provided the world can avoid global war for 
another twenty years, it is possible that secret in-
telligence can become simply the acquisition of informa-
tion which can help to produce more prosperity, which 
can show how to overcome food shortages in certain 
areas of the world, how to harness both science and the 
behaviour of human being to improve living standard. 
Tokyo has already pointed the way to this future use of 
secret service in countless ways which do not seem to 
have been grasped by many other nations.li9 
The conception to which he refers is a global probe, one which incor-
porates not only information on commerce, economic research, markets, 
technological developments and trade broadly construed but manage-
ment, organizational and technical knowledge and literally anything 
which impacts on productive capacity, particularly that which has 
defence implications. 
Chinese intelligence systems are also of particular interest because 
they can be compared to those of other communist states. Of particular 
importance is the fact that they operate quite differently from Soviet 
agencies. Here, as in Japan, the work of Sun Tzu has, and continues to 
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have, considerable influence.140 So too do secret societies. These on occa-
sion have become states within the state.141 As well there has been a 
marked trend over the last twenty years toward legal forms of foreign in-
telligence gathering and away from illegal or aggressive methods. In par-
ticular, there have been few examples of attempts to suborn or bribe 
foreign scientists or researchers.'42 
Dale Eickelman's anthropological research on intelligence in Arab 
states has posed a particularly interesting question about intelligence in 
the non-Western World.14' By focussing on a small, region-oriented in-
telligence system, that of the Sultanate of Oman, he has been able to add 
to the process of discerning what impact organizational cultures have on 
the production and content of political threats.144 Because Omani in-
telligence was so long under the British, he is able to examine, by com-
paring intelligence structures in one state over time, to what degree a 
"British" intelligence agency (i.e. a western-trained and supervised 
organization) sees the world differently from an Arab one. His argument 
is that intelligence officers tend to focus more on declared hostile 
states'45 than those which are considered to be friendly or peripheral to 
imminent security or political concerns. Significantly, he suggests that 
when threats are diffuse their delineation depends more on prevailing 
conceptions of politics. His warning is clear. Effective intelligence 
analysis of non-Western states requires a profound understanding of 
cultural and social circumstances and a long-term perspective of political 
change. 
This message has been stated more strongly by Adda Bozeman on 
several occasions.146 While she admits that some progress has been made 
in developing a better understanding of the Soviet Union and Marxist-
Leninist societies147, she believes that little has changed in western 
perceptions of non-communist, non-western peoples. In terms of 
American relations with such states she believes that the United States 
has shot itself in the foot. She argues that it has a proven "incompetence 
to predict, contain, and assess the impact of Marxism-Leninism and 
totalitarian statecraft on their destinities" and that this failure stems not 
only from a faulty reading of communist strategies but from a "stubborn 
disposition to identify non-Western states in terms of their nominal 
Western appearance rather than in those of their authentic 
substance.'"41 In short, we continue to see deviations from what we con-
sider to be trans-nationally valid standards of behaviour and reasoning 
as mindless and irrational acts. As she has so poignantly pointed out it is 
the authentic substance not the nominal appearance that provides the 
countervailing force to the intruding and alien power: 
and these differ greatly from one case to the next as do 
the tactics of Leninists principals and surrogates. Since 
American do not know the basis or substratal con-
figurations of non-Western mind-sets, they are obviusly 
not equipped in intelligence terms either to isolate these 
"contra" forces or to anticipate, preclude, and actually 
cope with Communist-controlled insurgencies. 
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By programmatically dissimulating the true iden-
tities of just about all non-Communist non-Western 
states, the U.S. government has deluded itself so 
thoroughly that the United States has so far lost the cold 
war of ideas and nerves, the twentieth-century war that 
counts.14' 
As a result, she has argued for detailed comparative case studies of 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the ASEAN nations of South East Asia, India, 
Black Africa, Latin America, and the Islamic Middle East.150 Her 
message is clear. Those who want to define intelligence structures and 
functions in the non-Western world must do so from the facts of the 
culture under study. They must not extrapolate them from the implicit or 
explicit normative theories of the West.151 
VIII. THE CANADIAN LITERATURE: 
Research conducted by Canadian scholars on security and in-
telligence matters and by scholars generally into Canada's security and 
intelligence community is now beginning to grow.1" Four important 
developments have helped encourage this climate of investigation and in-
terest. First, and perhaps foremost, the McDonald Commission of In-
quiry into RCMP Wrongdoing initiated a country-wide debate on the 
issue and created an on-going interest in the subject. Second, funding has 
encouraged research in this field. An important benefactor in this regard 
has been the Canadian government.1" Third, the establishment of the 
Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies in 1985 has 
provided a vehicle by which interested persons and scholars can meet and 
communicate with each other. And finally, the last three or four years 
has seen the development of a conference circuit for this field.154 
The Canadian literature has focussed almost entirely on five specific 
areas; wartime experiences, post-war espionage, terrorism, the activities 
of the RCMP, and those of the CIA in Canada.155 Until very recently lit-
tle of the literature produced was of a scholarly nature. 
A. Wartime Experiences 
Canada's wartime experiences are far from fully documented. Never-
theless, what is available is of considerable importance because it il-
lustrates the developmental choices that were made and those that were 
avoided. There is but one short essay which attempts to assess the overall 
part that Canada played in the Allied intelligence effort. That was publish-
ed under the authorship of Peter St. John.156 It touches on three important 
developments: the controversial part played by Sir William Stephenson, 
the Canadian appointed to head British Security Coordination in New 
York; the development of a signals intelligence capacity to intercept, 
decipher and analyze Axis diplomatic traffic and enemy wireless transmis-
sions at sea; and certain post war developments.157 In the last regard it 
shows that Canada was ready at war's end to form a fully-fledged in-
telligence service.151 For reasons not yet publicly explained Canada stepped 
back from developing a foreign HUMINT capacity.159 
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Canada's military intelligence capacity underwent significant 
changes as the result of wartime experiences. These have been 
documented in a general way by Wesley Wark and at length for the army 
by S.R. Elliot."0 Canada's important contribution to naval radio in-
telligence in the Atlantic has been detailed by W.A.B. Douglas and 
Jürgen Rohwer.161 It was, in fact, the success of Canada's independently-
run SIGINT capacity in naval "Y" material that provided Canada with 
an entrée into the Allied intelligence community. According to Wark, it 
was responsible for breaking old patterns of intelligence sharing ir-
revocably and establishing new rules for co-operation.162 Canada would 
no longer be just a passive recipient of British and American intelligence. 
It would be a producer and eventually a partner in the UKUSA agree-
ment governing signals intelligence. Another contribution to the allied 
war effort came surprisingly from prisoners of war. Information 
presented by Don Page and John Kelly shows how German POWs were 
turned from being a burden on Canada into useful allied intelligence and 
propaganda assets.1*3 
The war also led to the development of a covert operations capacity 
in Canada and to the use of Canadian trained spies and saboteurs in 
Europe.164 Here a major piece of historical research has recently been 
conducted by David Stafford.165 His Camp X: Canada's School for 
Secret Agents, 1941-45 is of particular importance because it illustrates 
some of the ways intelligence ideas were transmitted from Britain to the 
United States. In this regard the American debt to the British has long 
been acknowledged.'" Also significant is the fact that this transmission 
of ideas occurred partly on Canadian soil. But Stafford's work is also 
important because of the myths concerning allied co-operation that it 
destroys. In the final analysis Stafford has concluded: 
The reality is that Camp X played a modest but intrigu-
ing part in the story of American-British-Canadian 
cooperation during the Second World War . . . Camp 
X provided an example of this alliance in action and a 
limited foretaste of what was to come . . . But in some 
ways Camp X was more symbol than substance.167 
Importantly, no future was found for the covert capacity after the war. 
Some details of Canada's wartime counter-espionage and security 
efforts are to be found in the rare memoirs of senior RCMP officials. Of 
these C.W. Harvison's The Horsemen is perhaps the most valuable.161 
Collectively, these memoirs make two important claims. One is that a 
well-organized Nazi subversive threat existed before the war and that this 
and a carefully built German intelligence network were quickly 
eradicated immediately after the outbreak of war by decisive government 
action and dedicated police work. The other is that the German spies and 
saboteurs who did make it to Canada showed a surprising degree of inep-
titude. These accounts need to be read in juxtaposition with British 
criticisms of Canadian security and the numerous recent books and ar-
ticles that indicate the extent to which the Canadian government clamped 
down on domestic political activities and interned people on ethnic and 
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political grounds with little care about the civil liberties of those involved 
or evidence of planned subversion.169 In this regard two important ar-
ticles deserve special mention. Keyserlingk argues that rather than being 
fully prepared the police and bureaucracy had failed to collect hard in-
formation about either German Canadians or Nazism in Canada. As a 
result, when a frightened and confused Canadian public demanded ac-
tion against a supposed vast internal Nazi threat, the govenment 
responded with hastily instituted, ill-informed programs while those 
tasked with the job of administering these programs responded by quick-
ly producing Nazi agents.170 The lack of preparedness may have had 
much to do with how the police and government perceived the security 
threat. Whitaker, in his analysis of the repression of communism during 
the war, has argued that contrary to popular beliefs the 'enemy within' 
remained the same, from Winnipeg through Stalingrad to Yalta.171 
B. Espionage: 
Canada has the unenviable reputation of being the first espionage 
casualty of the cold war. A month to the day after the Americans drop-
ped the first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima the Cana-
dian Prime Minister learned that the Soviets were spying on Canada. 
This revelation was not the result of good counterintelligence work. It 
stemmed from the defection of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the 
Soviet embassy. Surprisingly, there is still no full scholarly assessment of 
his defection—beyond that of Gouzenko himself and a few more sensa-
tional accounts172—or of the long-term effect it has had on the Canadian 
political culture.173 Nor is there any work on the other defectors that 
have come Canada's way. 
In the sixties Canada experience a sex scandal involving cabinet 
ministers which had overtones of espionage. Unlike the Profumo scandal 
in Britain the Gerda Munsinger affair created little public uproar and 
minimal academic or jounalistic interest.'7* 
The British "mole" studies have, however, found Canadian 
counterparts. John Sawatsky's study For Services Rendered, plots the 
rise and fall of what he claims to be "the most influential officer" in the 
history of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service; that of 
Jim Bennett.175 The RCMP's case against Bennett, who at the time of his 
"retirement" in 1972 was head of the Russian desk of the RCMP's 
Counterespionage Branch, was that he deliberately caused the counteres-
pionage activities of the RCMP to fail and that he was in the service of 
the KGB. To this story must be added those concerning Canadian am-
bassadors to Moscow. The story of John Watkins who was snared in a 
KGB homosexual'76 sex plot and died during an interrogation under Ben-
nett is partly told in Sawatsky's book.177 That of Herbert Norman is the 
subject of the much scholarship.17' Interestingly, two books by the 
American academics come to dramatically different conclusions. That by 
James Barros concludes that Norman was a Soviet agent shielded by 
Prime Minister Pearson and the Department of External Affairs.179 Ac-
cording to at least one authority on Norman his work fails to find the 
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smoking gun and "has to build his case on guilt by association, a dubious 
technique more suited to witch-hunters than to academic historians.""0 
Roger Bowen's book, Innocence is not Enough: The Life and Death of 
Herbert Norman, depicts Norman as the quintessential liberal democrat 
who committed suicide because he feared that a further interrogation 
would force him to name names.111 The story of a known and identified 
"mole" has been told by Leo Heaps.'" His subject, his long-time friend, 
Hugh Hambleton, was arrested by the British, tried in London, and 
sentenced to an English jail for ten years in 1983. The story is an odd 
one. It begins with a syndicated article that appeared in several Canadian 
newspapers in 1980. In it Hambleton admitted passing on open source 
materials to the Soviets. In the middle were the investigations of a bevy 
of intelligence agencies (the RCMP, the CIA, MI5, the Mossad and the 
Yugoslav Police), his arrest while on a visit to the U.K., evidence that he 
committed no crime on British soil, and the dramatic claim by the defen-
dant that he was a triple agent working for the Canadians, the French 
and the KGB. Unanswered lie several important questions. Why was 
Hambleton tried in Britain? Why was he not extradited to Canada? Who 
in Canada granted him immunity? And why did it take the Canadian in-
telligence services three years to initiate investigations after it was known 
that he was working for the Soviets?1" 
One ramification of Gouzenko's defection that has sparked 
academic interest is the development of administrative security pro-
grams."4 In many respects the system that emerged in the post-war 
period was the product of that which had been in existence during the 
war."5 In shaping its post-war security and intelligence community 
Canada drew on the British experience and its own political culture."6 As 
a result, it responded quite differently from the United States during the 
McCarthy era."7 It therefore points to an important point of similiarity 
and differences for those who compare security and intelligence struc-
tures and functions. As Aronsen has noted, the Canadian response to in-
ternal security was essentially to see it as an administrative problem not, 
as was the case in the United States, as a political issue.1" 
Government documents and royal commission reports share the 
common feature of not attempting to put the threat to Canadian security 
in quantitative and qualitative terms. A major attempt to rectify this 
deficiency has been attempted by David Charters. Working only from 
secondary sources on the public record he has amassed a considerable 
amount of data to clarify Canada's experience as a target for espionage 
by the Soviet Union during the period from 1945-1986. His analysis 
shows that during the late seventies and eighties the Soviets placed a high 
emphasis on high-technology targets."9 
C. Terrorism: 
Domestic terrorism has had an important impact on the develop-
ment and regulation of Canada's security intelligence capacity. The 
Canadian terrorist literature focusses largely on two events: The so-
called October Crisis of 1970 and the activities of the Canadian Sikh 
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community. Of the two the former is the more voluminous. It is in this 
category too that French Canadians have made their greatest contribu-
tion towards security and intelligence studies in Canada.190 And it is with 
the proclamation by the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau of the 
emergency measures to stem the crisis that Canadians begin to focus on 
the propriety of police and intelligence agencies and the potential 
diminution of civil liberties in the name of noble causes."1 The literature 
on Canada's Sikh community is as yet only in its infancy and focusses 
largely on the crash of an Air India jumbo jet on route from Toronto to 
London."2 
The theoretical literature on terrorism is also underway. One of the 
earliest articles to explore the relationship between political violence and 
the Canadian political culture was conducted by Judy Torrance."* This 
compared the responses of Canadian governments over more than a cen-
tury. Much work has been done by Ron Crelinsten, Micheal Kelly and 
Thomas Mitchell regarding the relationship between terrorism and the 
media."4 Maurice Tugwell has examined the relationship between ter-
rorism and propaganda and has attempted to evaluate the utility of ter-
rorism."' An important contribution to the discussion of definitional 
issues has been provided by Thomas H. Mitchell."* Ron Crelinsten's ar-
ticle on the internal dynamics of the FLQ is insightful."7 Tim Smith has 
done some interesting comparative work of the responses to terrorism in 
Canada, the U.S. and the Britain."' Tony Kellett has made a particularly 
valuable contribution with his analysis of the impact of international ter-
rorism on Canada."' And Jeffrey Ross has established Canada's first 
terrorism data base.200 To these must be added the two forthcoming 
studies of democratic responses to international terrorism, conducted by 
the Centre of Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick201 and the 
development of two extensive bibliographical sources on international 
terrorism.202 
D. Activities of the RCMP: 
The October Crisis of 1970 led eventually to a crisis of a different 
nature—the re-evaluation of a national symbol, the RCMP. A major 
failing of the RCMP Security Service during the October Crisis had been 
its inability to establish the links between FLQ cells and thus to establish 
the size and nature of the conspiracy. This was responsible in part for the 
Liberal government's overreaction and the invocation of the War 
Measures Act. In the aftermath the Liberal government of Prime 
Minister Trudeau put pressure on the RCMP Security Service to keep it 
better informed. This the RCMP did partly by illegal means. What even-
tually resulted was two commissions of inquiry into wrongdoing commit-
ted by those charged with protecting the state against domestic terrorism 
and subversion in Quebec; one established by the Province of Quebec,203 
the other by the Federal Government. Of the two the McDonald Com-
mission was to have greater impact. Its extensive reports provide the 
most extensive analysis of Canada's security and intelligence community 
available to date. Before the Inquiry was finished a number of important 
books and articles appeared about the RCMP. Keith Walden's Visions 
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of Order examined the whole mythology associated with the Force.204 
Others focussed on the Security Service; still others on its wrongdoing. 
The most detailed analysis about the workings of the RCMP Security 
Service has been provided by John Sawatsky.205 He studiously avoided 
both the McDonald and Keable Commissions and derived his own 
sources. Others like Jeff Sallot, and Edward Mann and John Alan Lee 
focussed on the pandora's box that Robert Sampson had opened.206 
Some of those previously involved, like John Starnes, the first civilian 
director-general, actively lobbied for a new kind of service.207 Those with 
French Canadian interests focussed on the Trudeau government and how 
it stalled the Province of Quebec's Keable Commission.20' Still others 
had specific ideological and political axes to grind.209 Only Richard 
French and André Beliveau tried to understand from the evidence that 
was being presented before the McDonald and Keable commissions how 
the national police force could have come to commit such wrondgoing.210 
Writings in the period between the publication of the McDonald 
Commission's Second and Third reports and the enactment of legislation 
to establish a civilian security intelligence services separate from the 
RCMP may be divided into at least two groups. In the first period some 
important articles appeared concerning the credibility of the McDonald 
Commission. Michael Mandel, for example, suggested that the Liberal 
government had intentionally discredited the commission's work by 
releasing two opinions concerning the legality of certain police actions.2" 
This issue was examined more fully by the Attorney General of 
Canada212 and a federal/provincial committee of criminal justice of-
ficials under the chairmanship of R.M. McLeod, the Deputy Solicitor 
General of Ontario.213 From the time when Bill C-157 was introduced in-
to the Commons and the passage of Bill C-9 in July of 1984 a number of 
articles were written which specifically criticised the content of the pro-
posed legislation either for not extending propriety controls or for not 
giving the proposed agency enough rope.214 Articles supporting exten-
ding the propriety controls frequently came from those who had been 
part of the McDonald Commission or who had appeared before it.2lJ In 
a number of instances they were reprints of evidence that had been 
presented to committees of Parliament.2'* 
Following the passage of the CSISAct a number of scholarly papers 
have appeared about the legislation itself or about its possible use in 
other jurisdictions. Of the articles that have been published to date, a 
significant number have been written by those who were actively involv-
ed in the McDonald Commission. Three articles by C.E.S. Franks have 
discussed the issue of parliamentary or political control of intelligence in 
a variety of fora.217 M.L. Friedland has prepared an as yet unpublished 
study of security offenses for the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada.2,ï And John Edwards has suggested that the British should take 
a close look at the Canadian system.21* 
The issue of the balance between propriety and efficacy has now 
been looked at by a number of authors. A 1985 paper by this author ex-
amined the accountability mechanisms provided by the CSISAct and the 
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system of controls recommended by the McDonald Commission to en-
sure effective and efficient administration.220 A forthcoming paper by 
the same author examines the impact of institutional culture on both 
organizational deviance and administrative efficacy.221 Murray Rankin 
has written an important article on the propriety side of the equation.222 
Geoffey Weiler, who has presented a number of papers on the topic, has 
recently published an article which has attempted to assess whether CSIS 
is working more effectively than its predecessor.223 And two studies con-
ducted under Canadian Studies Research Awards provided by the Cana-
dian High Commission in London have assessed the performance of the 
Security and Intelligence Review Committee and Canadian intelligence 
policy.224 
To a certain degree the Canadian system has created interest abroad. 
In the United States the published work has focussed on the legal nature 
of the statute225 and on the democratic value of the scheme.226 In Bri-
tain227 and Australia22' it has so far been limited to review essays. 
As noted earlier, an important issue raised by the McDonald Com-
mission was the lawfulness of certain police actions. An important study 
was undertaken for the Law Reform Commission of Canada in this 
regard by Rosemary Cairns Way. She specifically set out to examine the 
differences between the positions of the McDonald Commission and 
those of the subsequent McLeod Report by drawing distinctions between 
duty and authority. Her legal analysis concluded that the approach ad-
vocated by the McLeod Report was seriously flawed and that "no 
authority to infringe on protected rights or liberty or property can be im-
plied simply from the existence of duty."229 
The McDonald Commission was not singularly responsible for 
focussing Canadian attention on the powers of state agents. This process 
was initiated earlier by the Trudeau government's response to the Oc-
tober Crisis and was sustained by a series of events and royal commission 
reports.230 Nevertheless, the Commission did encourage and influence 
writing on police powers231 and organizational police deviance.232 To all 
these must be added the annual reports of the Security and Intelligence 
Review Committee.233 
E. CIA Activities in Canada: 
As yet this is a very small body of literature. Before publication 
James Littleton's Target Nation214 was rumoured to reveal CIA covert 
activities in Canada. The published product has not done that. Rather it 
has attempted to demonstrate the degree to which Canada's intelligence 
community has become dominated by that of the United States and how 
it has taken on lock-stock-and-barrel the cold-war mentality so prevalent 
at times below the border. Though the evidence presented barely sustains 
this view, the potential lesson in Littleton's book is an important one. 
Legislative controls may come to naught if the two communities are too 
tightly knit. American interests may all too easily become Canadian in-
terests, especially as Canada is but a junior partner in the UKUSA agree-
ment, NOR AD and has no foreign HUMINT capacity. It is perhaps 
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because of such views that the Security Intelligence Review Committee 
has once again taken up the issue of a foreign intelligence agency for 
Canada and what constitutes a threat to the security of Canada. 
More worrying still are the recent books by Anne Collins, Don 
Gillmor, Gordon Thomas and Harvey Weinstein."3 These detail how the 
CIA supported the brainwashing research of Dr, Ewen Cameron in Mon-
treal in the 1960s without the knowledge of patients and Canadian public 
alike. Gillmor indicates that the funding for Cameron's "psychic driv-
ing" work was the second highest of all the forty-nine MKULTRA pro-
jects outlined in surviving CIA documents.2" This is disturbing because 
the MKULTRA projects were denounced by the CIA's Inspector General 
and medical personnel as improper as early as the 1950s. 
IX. SUMMARY: 
While a number of general trends in the literature may be discerned 
one more than any other sticks out. It concerns the special emphasis that 
has been given to the clandestine collection of information in foreign 
theatres of operation at the expense of other activities. This has had five 
important ramifications. First, it has worked towards an increase in 
status for foreign intelligence agencies per se. This has resulted not only 
in the a lower perceived status for departments involved in active 
measures generally (both at home and abroad) but has also meant that 
organizations involved in counter measures at home have been seen as 
poor cousins and have not reached the same status as agencies operating 
abroad. Second, it has helped to encourage a false home/abroad or 
foreign/domestic dichotomy. In the intelligence world boundaries are 
much more artificial than they appear to be on the map. Third, it has led 
to a false perception of the interrelationships that exist in terms of the 
roles and activities of the various security and intelligence organizations 
that make up the intelligence community. Certainly, there have been very 
few attempts to discern similarities, differences and overlaps between the 
organizations involved. These false perceptions have contributed 
towards a failure to observe how the activities of certain organizations, 
particularly those involved in technical collection, have risen in impor-
tance."7 Concentration on the processes of foreign intelligence has also 
tended to obscure some of the structures in the system and the functions 
they perform in the security process. This is particularly true of public 
police forces, and departments responsible for customs and immigration. 
Finally, it has tended to distort and obscure important aspects of the 
policy/operations dichotomy. This has resulted in intelligence gathering 
being perceived as an end in itself instead of being merely a strategy in a 
much larger process. This is exemplified in the most extreme case by 
those who see the security intelligence function more as a policing activi-
ty than as an intelligence one."' 
It is also important to note that the coverage of clandestine collec-
tion has normally focussed on high threat threshold scenarios. That is to 
say the timing of the discussion is placed during particular periods of 
hostility or when the threat to military confrontation is very high (e.g. 
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during the cold war). This has had both general and limited effects. On 
the one hand, it has helped increase the general status of the foreign in-
telligence gathering, synthesis, and dissemination processes. Yet on the 
other, it has served to reduce the significance of the need for particular 
types of intelligence gathering and dissemination in peacetime (par-
ticularly economic and political intelligence). And, of course, it has tend-
ed to divert attention away from the more mundane aspects of in-
telligence and security work during peacetime. On the intelligence side 
the significance of open sources of information is often overlooked. 
And, on the security side, the role and activities provided by public and 
private policing organizations are frequently never discussed. 
Another general trend that may be observed in the literature is that 
there have been few attempts to explain how and where the work of 
security and intelligence organizations overlap. Thus, it is true to say that 
authors, with a few notable exceptions,239 have seldom attempted to 
place the functions and organizations of a security and intelligence com-
munity on any form of continuum of activities. The failure to develop 
theories of interconnection has been an important contributor towards 
the general omission to observe changes in the signifcance in some of the 
actors in the system. In addition, it has been responsible for an in-
complete assessment being made of the levels of independence and 
discretion that have been alloted to key actors in the systems. And it has 
resulted in particular relationships with governments and interconnec-
tions with various consumer and policy producing departments being 
overlooked, obscured or undeservedly down played. 
But perhaps the most important weakness is the fact that the 
literature does not represent a true picture of western intelligence com-
munities in certain critical aspects. Most notably, it does not reflect the 
general failure of western intelligence agencies since the Second World 
War to penetrate Soviet-bloc services using human sources (HUMINT). 
True, technical services have provided a fairly clear picture of Soviet bloc 
capacities. But such information is of limited value unless one can 
establish the likely actions of those who control them. Without some ac-
cess to Soviet intentions the West will forever be left debating the nature 
of the Soviet threat. The real danger here is that perceptions of the threat 
will be dominated by the turn of our own politics, not theirs, and oppor-
tunities for a more peaceful world may be lost for a generation or so. 
This failure has had wide ramifications on four fronts. First, it led 
to the extension of capabilities for, and later the formation of new agen-
cies for, conducting technological methods of covert collection on a 
wide-scale.240 Second, the failure of covert collection has led the agencies 
responsible for this function to put their personnel to other uses. This has 
encouraged organizations to shift emphasis in recent years away from 
Soviet-bloc penetrations to covert operations in the Third World where 
successes have helped maintain prestige. Third, it has provided a com-
pelling argument for conducting "mole hunts" in both counter-
intelligence and foreign intelligence agencies. And finally, the general 
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lack of attention paid in the literature to this failure has retarded the in-
troduction of effective, broad-mandate oversight mechanisms on efficien-
cy grounds. 
The literature review has provided a clear indication that several con-
ceptions of security and intelligence communities exist. Each of the area 
studies has provided important lessons. The dominant paradigm, that 
presented by the United States, concerns a model where primacy is given to 
foreign intelligence gathering against the Soviet bloc. Academically it 
reflects the perspectives of political scientists and international relations 
specialists. It often lacks a sense of historical perspective and an urbane 
understanding of culture.241 In many respects it is tunnel-visioned. It is 
constricted by its own political culture and its own ideology. The major 
debate—that concerning the relationship between intelligence gathering, 
policy formation and covert action—remains unresolved. This is partly 
due to internecine struggles within the CIA itself and also within the 
broader parameters of the large security and intelligence community. But 
the main impediment to a resolution of the problem appears to lie in a 
failure to develop a theoretical framework which not only incorporates a 
strategic planning approach to the problem—one that fully integrates 
overall goals, immediate objectives and short- and long-term 
strategies—but integrates domestic and foreign theatres of operation and 
intelligence, security and policing practices. 
The model said to represent intelligence studies in the United 
Kingdom is historical, but it is, like the American perspective, dominated 
by twentieth-century vistas. Not integrated into the "intelligence mind-
frame" are a wealth of studies on the Irish problem. Were they to be in-
tegrated, then relationships between internal and external intelligence 
gathering and responses to insurgency and terrorism would be brought 
within the frame. Likewise, the voluminous work on British and Irish 
policing remains outside the vision. The theoretical and historical work in 
this area has much to offer the "strictly intelligence school" of thought. 
Two Soviet models are perceived. One driven firmly by ideological 
considerations is dominated by the notion that the USSR constitutes an 
"evil empire" with the intelligence community as primary instrument for 
achieving world domination. This view frequently lacks a historical 
perspective. It fails to incorporate Russian security and intelligence prac-
tices before the Bolshevik revolution and it fails to remember the 
numerous European invasions of Russia that have occurred. And impor-
tantly, it fails to consider the significant loss of life and devastation suf-
fered by the Soviets during the Second World War. The other model sees 
the Soviet Union within the context of Soviet political culture. This view 
leads to a perception of the USSR as a national security state with the 
primary responsibility of security and intelligence organizations being 
security, not intelligence gathering or covert action. This view may have 
broader lessons when it comes to developing theoretical frameworks for 
describing security and intelligence communities and their work. 
So too will perceptions of security and intelligence work by so-called 
pariah states. They show that dramatically different threats create 
80 
Conflict Quarterly 
dramatically different types of security and intelligence networks and 
dramatically different interpretations. Once again they demonstrate the 
need for scholars to immerse themselves in political culture before com-
ing to conclusions too early. 
The study of security and intelligence work in the non-Western 
world is particularly enlightening because it demonstrates the need for 
multi-disciplinary perspectives. And more than any other group it rein-
forces the need for culturally-based approaches. 
As yet there is no single Canadian school of intelligence studies. In 
this regard the academic arena reflects the goals of the Canadian 
Association for Security and Intelligence Studies which merely attempts 
to foster informed debate and promote research. Nevertheless, the Cana-
dian system and structure is both unique and informative. It has as yet no 
foreign intelligence service with the authority to collect intelligence 
abroad through covert means or to conduct covert actions. Thus it il-
lustrates clearly that security and intelligence structures of liberal 
democracies can differ dramatically from those of their "parents". As 
such it posses important questions. Is there a uniquely Canadian view of 
security and intelligence? And can the Canadian case provide important 
theoretical lessons for broader security and intelligence studies? 
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